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Introduction 
After the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, China rapidly shut itself off from the rest 
of the world. Emigration from China, already much reduced due to the Great Depression and the 
Second World War, diminished even further and came to an almost complete standstill in the 1960s, 
with the important exception of illegal emigration across the border into Hong Kong.  
This situation contrasts sharply with Chinese migration today. China now is one of the most 
important sending countries and has also become increasingly significant as a destination for 
international migrants from the whole world. The most important fact about Chinese international 
migration is perhaps the incredible diversity of migratory flows. The interaction between the many 
different Chinese migratory flows and communities is clearly crucial in shaping the way that new 
migrants insert themselves in receiving societies. Unlike thirty years ago, migrants are now from all 
kinds of social and cultural backgrounds, hail from all over China, and include business and government 
expatriates, investors and entrepreneurs, students, professionals, contract workers, unskilled job seekers, 
and family migrants. Chinese migrants fan out all over the world in search of employment, business 
opportunities, educational qualifications, marriage or family reunification. Added to this must be the 
vastly larger number of Chinese who travel abroad for shorter periods as tourists or visitors on business, 
on exchange programmes, or as members of delegations. The world is indeed becoming a Chinese space, 
with long-term emigration being a vital, but by no means the only component. 
In the first chapter of this report we outline the main changes in the Chinese migration order since 
roughly 1980. In the second chapter we turn to a discussion of Chinese emigration and settlement in 
Europe (by which we mainly refer to the EU countries) and Africa (mainly sub-Saharan Africa), 
whose similarities and contrasts help us highlight the range of permutations in recent emigration from 
China. The third chapter turns to China’s administration, management and institutional and legal 
framework for dealing with the many different Chinese migratory flows and their ramifications for 
China, both domestically and for its rising global presence. Chapter 4 is a brief conclusion including 
some reflections on future trends. 
1. Chinese international migration trends 
The most important change in the Chinese emigration order in the last forty years obviously has been the 
resumption of emigration from the PRC. The main driver, at least initially, of the new migration from the 
PRC was a gradual but fundamental relaxation of the country’s emigration policy from the early 1970s 
onward. From an almost total ban on officially endorsed emigration, the PRC moved to a policy 
framework that now allows foreign travel and emigration to virtually all Chinese citizens who can 
produce a visa or other evidence of the right of legitimate entry to a foreign country. The frequent 
chastening of China for not letting its citizens out is now but a vague memory of a distant Cold War past. 
Between the early 1970s and late 1980s, the new Chinese migration from the PRC consisted of two 
very different types. The first one was the resumption of emigration from areas where before 1949 the 
majority of overseas Chinese came from. These new overseas Chinese first went to communities of 
overseas Chinese established before 1949, but gradually branched out to other destinations in search of 
opportunities. The chief examples of this are migrants from the Taishan area in Guangdong province to 
the US and from the Wenzhou/Qingtian area in Southern Zhejiang province to Europe. Only somewhat 
later did emigration from the central part of Fujian province start. Despite being an old overseas area 
with communities in Southeast Asia, Central Fujian had no pre-existing ties with North America and 
Europe. Nevertheless, those became the chief destination areas of new migrants from Fujian.  
The second initial flow of new Chinese migrants consisted of students and visiting scholars. 
Chinese students chiefly went to the US, with smaller numbers accepted by other developed countries 
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(Japan, Canada, Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand) as well. At this time, almost all Chinese 
students were postgraduates, accepted and supported on exchange programmes or western 
scholarships; few Chinese could as yet afford the costs of study abroad themselves. 
This relatively ordered pattern of Chinese international migration, with reasonably well-defined 
flows and areas of origin and destination, changed fundamentally in the 1990s and 2000s. Some of 
these changes were at least partially path-dependent in that they followed from the impact that on-
going migration had on policy-making and social and economic development in sending and receiving 
areas. However, change has equally much been driven by fundamental changes in Chinese society. 
Economic reform in the cities really began to bite in the early 1990s, weaning increasing numbers of 
urban Chinese from the dependence and restrictions of the Chinese “work unit” system. Reform and 
foreign trade also generated unprecedented economic growth, in turn creating a new entrepreneurial 
elite and middle class with a life style and expectations to match. In terms of social and spatial 
mobility, Chinese now have almost as much freedom as residents of non-socialist countries. However, 
as China’s market reform creates an increasingly level playing field, it produces not only winners but 
also losers: rural dwellers in the interior or otherwise isolated places, farmers in peri-urban areas 
losing their land to development projects, and urban residents shed by state enterprise reform without 
much hope of finding comparable employment elsewhere.  
The overall result of these developments has been that the types, origins and destinations of 
Chinese migration have changed and proliferated, both within China itself and abroad. Emigration is 
no longer limited to a few pockets of Chinese society, but has become an option that can be 
entertained by Chinese across the country and from a wide range of backgrounds. In other words, 
these migratory flows have to be understood as transnational aspects of domestic patterns of 
geographical and social mobility resulting from the fundamental changes that have taken place in 
Chinese society, rather than being caused by the near-universal “culture of migration” in many 
overseas Chinese areas. The universalization of migration across China therefore emphatically not 
entail that the number of Chinese migrants is now only limited by the obstacles that sending and 
receiving countries manage to put in their way – many factors impinge on migratory decisions, 
opportunity being one and only one of them – but it does mean that Chinese migration has become 
highly diverse, making it increasingly difficult to speak about Chinese migration in the singular in any 
analytically meaningful sense. Below we will briefly review the most important of these changes in 
the Chinese migration order. We will start with (1) commercialization of emigration; and then discuss 
(2) the involvement of local government before moving on first to (3) the globalization of Chinese 
migration and then (4) the rise and diversification of education and professional migration.  
The emigration business has become a world-wide phenomenon that includes everything from 
schools for language or professional training in preparation for work or study abroad, to emigration 
agencies that advertise in newspapers or on the Internet, to the gradual commercialization of assistance 
originally given free of charge to friends or family. The commercialization and professionalization of 
emigration was pioneered by Fujianese migrants to the US in the 1980s. The first things that may very 
well come to mind here are illegal migration, asylum abuse, human smuggling and trafficking, but 
commercialization is actually a much broader issue. In recent years and in response to increasingly 
successful attempts at cracking down on people smuggling from China, smugglers in Fujian branched 
out from transport by sea and over land to organized flights using counterfeit documents. When that 
became increasingly difficult as well, smugglers started arranging for genuine visas for fake marriage, 
business or study abroad.1
                                                     
1 Frank N. Pieke, Pál Nyíri, Mette Thunø and Antonella Ceccagno, Transnational Chinese: Fujianese Migrants in Europe. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, chapter 3 (2004); Julie Y. Chu, Cosmologies of Credit: Transnational Mobility and 
the Politics of Destination in China, Durham: Duke University Press, chapter 3, 2010.  
 Emigration from Fujian foreshadowed developments in China’s Northeast 
(also known as Manchuria) and other provinces, which in the late 1990s suddenly put themselves on 
the Chinese emigration map. The Northeast in the 1990s was a rustbelt of ill-performing state-owned 
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enterprises. Emigration provided urban workers a much needed escape from unemployment; in their 
wake, rural dwellers also quickly availed themselves of the opportunities to go abroad. Commercial 
agencies that facilitate travel and emigration abroad drive much of the emigration from the Northeast 
and elsewhere. These agencies are often connected to state-owned enterprises and operate in full view 
of the authorities.2
Local government is involved in Chinese emigration in ways that are often not condoned by policy 
or law of the central government. Central Fujian province provides the best-documented example. 
Informally, individual officials of the government of coastal central Fujian had been involved in the 
illegal emigration business already from the early 1980s (one of the key reasons why emigration could 
flourish in this area), but the government could not openly been seen to be involved.
  
3
In many other places beyond the designated overseas Chinese areas, local government (rather than 
individual officials) is in fact one of the key agents in the spread of mass emigration. The first example 
from my own research dates from 1990 in the interior of Fujian province (principally Mingxi County), 
an industrial centre dating from Mao Zedong “Third Front” strategy of the 1960s and early 1970s, but 
also an area without any overseas Chinese tradition. Acutely aware of the success of international 
migration very nearby in coastal Central Fujian, the authorities were keen to raise the local standard of 
living through migration just as had happened along the coast. At the time, the local government’s 
encouragement of emigration still had to be carefully weighed against the provincial government’s 
displeasure and the general sensitivities arising from Fujian’s illegal emigration business, and the local 
government could not openly facilitate emigration. Later, however, the county government felt 
confident enough to establish a migration guarantee fund. This fund gave loans to potential migrants to 
help them pay for their migration overseas. Money for the fund was provided by the county’s 
International Economic and Trade Office, the Agricultural Bank, and the Department of Finance. 
Subsequently, a new policy allowed banks directly to fund migration rather than through this 
government fund, thus even further widening the scope of such practices and fully integrating 
migration into the local economy. With the backing of the local authorities, the area became an 
important sending area of Chinese migrants to Europe. 
 
4
The third key feature of the new Chinese migration order is the globalization of migration. Until 
the late 1980s, individual Chinese migratory flows tended to specific destination areas with well-
established Chinese ethnic sectors and communities from the same area of origin, only gradually 
expanding into adjacent areas, thus minimizing competition between Chinese groups. Starting in the 
mid-1980s, the Fujianese were the first to break through this mould. By focussing on the US and later 
Western Europe, Fujianese migrants entered the territories of entrenched communities of Chinese 
from Hong Kong, Guangdong, or Zhejiang, where they were mostly treated with hostility and as 
cheap, expendable labour. 
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s this example was quickly followed by the Zhejiangese, who 
aggressively expanded from their traditional stronghold in Western (and more recently Southern) 
Europe. In the 1990s, Zhejiangese appeared in new frontier areas, such as Eastern Europe or Africa. 
They also established a foothold in North America. 
                                                     
2 Frank N. Pieke and Xiang Biao, “Legality and labor: Chinese migratory workers in Britain”, Encounters 3, pp. 15-38, 2010. 
3 This is information from informal conversations with members of foreign visiting delegations or journalists and of-the-
record comments in interviews with migrants, but is hard to corroborate in formal interviews or other sources. Published 
academic research carefully skirts the issue, only mentioning tacit or active encouragement of emigration or corrupt 
involvement by local officials; see Chu, Cosmologies of Credit, chapter 3; Pieke et al., Transnational Chinese, chapter 2 ; 
M.R.J. Soudijn, Chinese Human Smuggling in Transit. Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2006, p. 69; Sheldon X. 
Zhang, Chinese Human Smuggling Organizations: Families, Social Networks, and Cultural Imperatives. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2008.  
4 Pieke et al., Transnational Chinese, chapter 2.  
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Globalization of Chinese migration is also a consequence of the rise of educational and 
professional migration, which is the third aspect of the new Chinese migration order that we would 
like to highlight here. In the 1990s and 2000s, Chinese education migration has proliferated, both in 
terms of sheer numbers and in the range of student backgrounds, destinations, and degrees pursued. As 
China got richer, foreign study came within reach of the offspring of China’s burgeoning 
entrepreneurial elite and even the salaried middle classes.  
Chinese professional migration is to a large extent the by-product of educational migration, when 
graduates seek employment in the country of study (or perhaps elsewhere abroad) rather than return 
home. This pattern is particularly pronounced in the US, but is significant in for instance Western 
Europe and Japan as well. Direct immigration of professionals from the PRC is also significant and on 
the rise, not only to regions and countries where one might expect it (North America, Western Europe, 
Australia and New Zealand, Singapore and Hong Kong), but also to African countries that perhaps 
seem non-obvious to a Western observer.  
Since the late 1970s and accelerating in the early 1990s, Chinese migration has changed almost 
beyond recognition. Some old overseas Chinese areas (for instance in Southern Fujian or much of the 
Pearl River Delta) that were able to tap into the opportunities for employment and entrepreneurship in 
New Economic Zones close by have conspicuously failed to generate new flows of mass migration. 
However, other, less well-located overseas Chinese areas (Central Fujian, Southern Zhejiang, and to a 
lesser extent the Sze Yep area in Guangdong) have instead capitalized on their overseas links and have 
generated commercialized migration flows with a truly global reach. In these areas, emigration has 
become virtually universal: migrating abroad is the number one choice for success for all but the very 
rich and the very poor.  
Simultaneously, emigration has also become a much more generally available avenue for social 
mobility for people across China and from all kinds of backgrounds. For them, a decision to emigrate 
follows from diverse educational, employment, or entrepreneurial strategies in which emigration is 
carefully weighted up against domestic employment, entrepreneurship, or higher education, all of 
which may also include possible migration elsewhere in China. In other words, these migratory flows 
have to be understood as aspects of general domestic patterns of geographical and social mobility 
created by the fundamental changes that have taken place in Chinese society. Migrants of this type 
aspire to find white-collar employment or self-employment, although a considerable number may 
actually end up having to settle for low-skilled work abroad, either in the ethnic Chinese sector or else 
as day labourers in agriculture, manufacturing, or food-processing.5
2. Migration from China to Europe and Africa  
 The numbers involved in these 
migratory flows can be large and are most likely to grow in absolute terms, but we would expect that 
only a very small percentage of the potential migration base will ever actually emigrate. For the vast 
majority, opportunities in China itself will continue to be less risky and expensive, and more attractive, 
realistically available, or in tune with one’s preferred life style. 
Migratory flows to Europe and Africa reveal both clear similarities and profound differences. The 
similarities have to do with direct connections between at least some migratory flows to the regions 
and the general dynamics of the Chinese global migration system. The differences are explained by the 
specific mix and timing of individual Chinese migration flows in the two continents and the vastly 
different economies and societies that Chinese migrants encounter. In each continent, China’s highly 
diverse migratory flows encounter not only the institutions of the receiving countries and established 
groups of overseas Chinese, but also each other. In this encounter, Chinese migrants have to make 
choices on how to deal with the realities and discourses of Chinese life abroad, choices that in turn 
                                                     
5 Pieke and Xiang, “Legality and labor.” 
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weave patterns of community formation, identity creation, division of labour and political participation 
that are as much Chinese as they are unique to each place and time.  
Another factor is the different strategic role of the two continents for China. This is in particular a 
factor that is often discussed in the context of China’s involvement in Central and Southeast Asia, on 
the African continent and in Latin America, regions where China is often suspected of expansionist, 
hegemonic, or even neo-colonial ambitions. This has given rise to a virtual cottage industry of popular 
or academic work that directly or indirectly derives from Samuel Huntington’s post-Cold War 
dystopic ruminations.6
2.1 Europe 
 In the discussion below, we will make some reference to these concerns in the 
context of Africa without however wishing to imply that there is a plan for Chinese world domination 
in which Chinese emigration is one strategic component. Chinese migration (and investment and 
trade) is simply too diverse and too much subject to individual, local, or sectorial agency to be 
subordinated to Beijing’s agenda. Conversely, in China different policy priorities compete with each 
other that make it very difficult to arrive at a sustained and coordinated approach to migration and its 
strategic implications. 
Chinese living in Europe can be divided into two main categories. Europe has long been the destiny of 
Chinese migrants seeking employment or trading opportunities, often in a specific Chinese sector of 
the economy. Their aim usually is to start in menial, unskilled employment and then work one’s way 
up to become the owner of a business, for instance a restaurant, store, or workshop. The other group of 
Chinese residents is, on the whole, a much more recent development. Chinese are increasingly coming 
to Europe to study at a university, vocational school, training programme, or high school. In addition, 
an unknown number of wealthy Chinese own a second home in Europe, are here as expatriate 
employees of Chinese firms or organizations, have immigrated or stayed behind after graduation as 
professionals, or have married a European resident. 
Meaningful and reliable figures on the total number of Chinese in Europe are notoriously hard to 
get. This is not a new problem, yet little seems to be done about it. Eurostat collects and compiles data 
from its member states; a recent report details that China with 97,000 immigrants in 2008 was the 
second largest source of immigrants into the EU (after Morocco with 157,000). The same report states 
that Chinese were the tenth most numerous group of foreign citizens resident in the EU with 2.1 per 
cent of EU total foreign population in 2008. With a reported total number of foreign nationals in EU 
member states (including nationals from other EU states) of 31,860,300, this percentage yields a total 
of 669,066 Chinese nationals in the EU in 2008.7
National statistical bureaus of individual European countries often (but not always) provide 
numbers on their Chinese population. However, individual countries employ different definitions and 
methodologies to divide their population up into ethnic or national categories. The UK, for instance, 
employs ethnic self-identification in its censuses. In 2011, this yielded a total number of resident 
ethnic Chinese in England and Wales of 393,141.
  
8 The Netherlands in its population records uses 
country of birth of self and/or parents: a 2011 study yielded a total number of Chinese of 71,500 in 
2010, almost two-thirds Dutch nationals.9
                                                     
6 Samuel P. Huntington, The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order, New York: Simon Schuster, 1996. An 
example currently very much in vogue appears to be Martin Jacques, When China rules the world: the end of the western 
world and the birth of a new global order. London: Allen Lane, 2009. 
  
7 Eurostat, Migrants in Europe - A statistical portrait of the first and second generation, 2011, p. 73 and p. 75; 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-31-10-539/EN/KS-31-10-539-EN.PDF. 
8 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-286262. 
9 Mérove Gijsberts, Willem Huijnk and Ria Vogels, eds, Chinese Nederlanders: van horeca naar hogeschool (Chinese 
Dutch: from catering trade to university), The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2011, p. 29 and 41. 
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One Chinese estimate of the total number of Chinese in Europe (however that might have been 
defined or measured) ranges between 2.6-3.2 million in 2010. Of this group 800,000 are said to be 
“new migrants” who plan to stay in Europe (excluding illegal migrants and students).10 This estimate, 
while probably generous, seems not too far off the mark when compared to the Eurostat, UK and 
Dutch figures, especially when not taken too literally and used merely as point of comparison with 
similarly derived figures for Africa and other places.11
2.1.1 Labour migration 
 
In all, five major groups of Chinese labour migrants have fanned out across Europe. In the 19th century 
the first to come to Europe were small traders from two adjacent areas in southern Zhejiang: the 
hinterland of the port city of Wenzhou and the rural area around the town of Qingtian.12
The second group are the Cantonese from the Pearl River Delta came to the major ports in 
Northwestern Europe (London, Liverpool, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Antwerp, and Hamburg) as 
seamen. By the end of the Second World War, most had left Europe, but a few stayed on. They were 
joined in the 1950s by fellow Cantonese from the New Territories of Hong Kong who came to Britain 
in large numbers to find work in the Chinese catering trade.
 Emigration 
from Zhejiang subsided after the Great Depression, the Second World War and the founding of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1949, but quickly gained pace again after roughly 1974. 
13
The third group of Chinese in Europe are from former European colonies in Southeast Asia and 
other regions. After the fall of the US-backed regimes in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in 1975, 
75,000 Chinese from Indochina fled to France; smaller numbers of refugees were accepted by other 
Western European countries. Approximately 10,000 Chinese from Indonesia arrived in the 
Netherlands after Indonesian independence in 1947 and the Chinese pogroms in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Finally, relatively small numbers of Chinese from other former colonies, such as Singapore, Malaysia, 
Mozambique and Surinam, also found their way to Europe. 
 From Britain they spread first to the 
Netherlands, and later to Belgium, France, Germany, Scandinavia, Spain and Portugal.  
A fourth group of Chinese are immigrants from Central Fujian province who appeared in Europe in 
the second half of the 1980s. Their arrival was a direct consequence of the activities of human 
traffickers in Fujian. Originally, most of those who ended up in other European countries either could 
not afford passage to America, were abandoned half-way, or were simply given no other choice. Only 
in the 1990s did Europe become the target of migratory flows from Fujian specifically destined for one 
or more countries in Europe, most commonly Britain or (in the case of Fujianese from Mingxi county) 
Central Europe or Italy.14
                                                     
10 These figures are from Song Quancheng, “Ouzhou de Zhongguo xin yimin: guimo ji tezheng de shehuixue fenxi” (New 
Chinese migrants in Europe: scale, special characteristics and sociological analysis), Shandong Daxue xuebao Year 2011, No. 
2, pp. 144-150. See also Li Minghuan, “Ouzhou Huaren shehui pouxi: renkou, jingji, diwei yu fenhua” (A social analysis of 
the Chinese in Europe: population, economy, position and composition). Shijie minzu Year 2009, No. 5, pp. 47-53. 
 
11 In the Dutch data (see note 5 above), roughly one-third of Chinese in the Netherlands holds Chinese citizenship. If we 
extrapolate this on to the Eurostat figure of 670,000 Chinese citizens we can conclude that there are probably three times 
as many, i.e. about 2 million people, with China as the country of birth of self and/or parents. To this an unknown but 
significant number of people must be added who in a UK-style census would classify themselves as Chinese, despite the 
fact that they or their parents were born outside China. A further unknown are illegal immigrants who are almost 
completely beyond the reach of government statistics. 
12 Thunø, Mette, “Moving stones from China to Europe: the dynamics of emigration from Zhejiang to Europe”, In Internal 
and international migration: Chinese perspectives, Frank N. Pieke and Hein Mallee, eds. Richmond: Curzon Press, pp. 
159-180, 1999. 
13 James L. Watson, “The Chinese: Hong Kong villagers in the British catering trade”, In James L. Watson, ed. Between two 
cultures: migrants and minorities in Britain, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 181-213, 1977. 
14 Frank N. Pieke, Pál Nyíri, Mette Thunø and Antonella Ceccagno, Transnational Chinese: Fujianese migrants in Europe, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. 
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The fifth and final wave of Chinese immigrants are city dwellers, initially mainly from Northeast 
China, but not much later from all over the country. Their presence became first apparent in Central 
and East Europe immediately after the fall of communism there. Particularly in the initial phases, their 
migration often was an individual, rather than a family decision. Many built on contacts with state 
enterprises and trading networks in China to provide goods and services to the undersupplied 
economies in the former Soviet bloc.15
Specialization in specific sectors of the economy has given the Chinese populations in each 
region of Europe its own characteristics. In Western Europe the catering trade and the ethnic sector 
continue to dominate. In Eastern Europe the importation, wholesale and retail of cheap Chinese 
manufactured goods is the main activity of the Chinese population. In Southern Europe Chinese 
specialize in small workshops that produce leather goods, garments or other products specifically 
aimed at local tastes and fashions. 
 Soon, however, urban Chinese appeared all over Europe. 
For labour migrants from old and new overseas Chinese areas, employment in Chinatown or more 
generally the Chinese ethnic sector, such as the catering trade or leather goods or garment sweatshops 
in Europe, is not merely a second choice option, but in fact the main pull factor. Immigration of large 
numbers of Chinese willing to accept often gruelling work and living conditions revitalized the ethnic 
enclave economies and spurred their growth and spread.  
What is unusual about the case of recent Chinese labour immigration is the sheer force and volume 
of the migration push generated by the high degree of commercialization of emigration in China. This 
has led to a surplus of Chinese labour and an even further deteriorating bargaining position of recent 
immigrants versus potential employers in the countries of destination. The obvious consequence has 
been an even further worsening of wages and working conditions. Migrants, especially if they stay and 
work illegally, are also especially vulnerable to extortion and protection rackets. Migration pressure in 
Britain recently has also had the effect of pushing Chinese migrants into employment outside the 
ethnic enclaves, which, in the case of women, also includes prostitution.16
2.1.2 Students and highly skilled migrants 
  
Young Chinese travel to Europe not only for a postgraduate degree at a top-level research university, 
but also for undergraduate degrees, high school diplomas, pre-university courses, or short-term 
certificate courses in English or other vocational skills. Europe is attractive not only for the quality of 
the education received, but also for the relatively modest fees that universities charge, especially 
compared to the usual number-one choice, the United States. Chinese students currently are by far the 
largest group of foreign students in most European countries, whose governments and educational 
institutions energetically compete in this profitable growth market.17
According to a recent report of the European Commission and the Chinese Ministry of Education, 
the total number of Chinese students in the EU in 2010 was between 118,700 and 120,000, or about 
six times more than in 2000. This number is comparable to the United States which had 127,600 
Chinese students in 2010. Of the total number of Chinese students in the EU, 40 per cent was in the 
UK, 23 per cent in France, and 20 per cent in Germany.
 
18
                                                     
15 Pál Nyíri, New Chinese migrants in Europe: the case of the Chinese community in Hungary, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999. 
 In the UK, China is the number one foreign 
16 Yun Gao and Véronique Poisson, Le trafic et exploitation des immigrants chinois en France, Geneva: International Labour 
Organization, 2005; Pieke and Xiang, “Legality and labor.” 
17 A. Bohm, M. Fallari, A. Hewett, S. Jones, N. Kemp, D. Meares, D. Pearc and K. Van Cauter , Vision 2020: Forecasting 
international student mobility a UK perspective, London: The British Council/IDP Australia, 2004. 
18 European Commission and the Ministry of Education in China, EU-China Student and Academic Staff Mobility: Present 
Situation and Future Developments, April 2011;  
http://ec.europa.eu/education/external-relation-programmes/doc/china/mobility_en.pdf. 
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country of origin for higher education students.19 There is some doubt whether this high number will 
continue in the future. Chinese universities have been expanding fast and Chinese parents and students 
often rank good universities in China higher than European universities. In the UK in the mid-2000, 
considerable disquiet existed among Chinese students at third-tier institutions, while English-language 
training centres were often mere fronts for labour immigration.20 Recently, the rescinding of post-
study work visas threatens to make the UK less attractive to Chinese students.21
The aspect of the Chinese presence in Europe that is least known about is investments and 
enterprises and the associated immigration of Chinese professionals and their families (and quite 
unlike Africa where it is the aspect that receives the most attention). Fortunately there is one recent 
study of Chinese direct investment in Europe by Haiyan Zhang, Zhi Yang and Daniël Van Den 
Bulcke.
  
22
2.2 Chinese in Africa 
 Haiyan Zhang will write another background paper for this project, so here I will be very 
brief on this subject. Chinese-invested enterprises fall roughly into two categories. Larger Chinese 
corporate subsidiaries are more concentrated in Western Europe. Smaller individual entrepreneurial 
firms predominate in Eastern Europe, although they are by no means absent in Western Europe. The 
smaller firms tend to be concentrated in wholesale or retail trade; the larger firms focus on knowledge-
intensive sectors. Smaller firms, usually privately owned, are more likely to have been set up in close 
corporation or even partnership with local Chinese, who thus play a crucial role in bringing these 
investments to Europe. Larger investments are strategic, aimed at accessing European technology, 
brands, markets and skills. They may employ local ethnic Chinese or Chinese from Hong Kong or 
Taiwan for their familiarity with western culture and business practices, but their business partners 
tend to be non-Chinese.  
There are currently about 10,000 South African-born Chinese, whose presence in the country dates back 
to the 17th century. During the era of apartheid, several tens of thousands Taiwanese (Taiwan being one 
of the few countries to recognize South Africa) came to and settled in the country: there are now several 
thousand left. Chinese emigrants from the PRC came in rapidly rising numbers from the late 1980s. 
Rough estimates of their numbers currently in South Africa range between 200,000 and 350,000.23
Chinese were present elsewhere on the continent at former Western trading ports or colonial 
centres, but, with the notable exception of Mauritius that served as a hub of the Chinese coolie trade, 
these were much smaller than the South African community. Africa now is very different: Chinese live 
in larger or smaller numbers all across the continent. They hail from all over China and are in Africa 
for many very different reasons and duration. Four different types of Chinese in Africa can be 
distinguished. The first is the established Chinese community of Chinese born in Africa. As 
mentioned, this category is only significant in South Africa and possibly Mauritius.  
  
                                                     
19 Higher Education Statistics Agency, Press release 172 – Non-UK domicile students, 23 February 2012; 
http://www.hesa.ac.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2371&Itemid=161. 
20 Personal communications to the author from the Chinese embassy in the UK and officials at the British Home Office. See also 
John Cross and Richard Hitchcock, “Chinese students’ (or students from China’s) views of UK HE: differences, difficulties 
and benefits, and suggestions for facilitating transition”, The East Asian Learner, Vol. 3, No. 2, November 2007. 
21 Chen Jia and Ai Yang, “UK visa rules may force Chinese student exodus”, China Daily 15 December 2010; 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-12/15/content_11702526.htm; Wang Dongliang, “UK visa policy change to 
impact Chinese students”, People’s Daily Online 21 March 2012; http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7765064.html. 
22 Haiyan Zhang, Zhi Yang and Daniël Van Den Bulcke, Euro-China investment report 2011-2012 – The European 
landscape of Chinese enterprises: An analysis of corporate and entrepreneurial firms and the role of the ethnic 
communities, Antwerp: Antwerp Management School, 2011;  
http://www.portofantwerp.com/circleoffriends/sites/default/files/imce/Testimonials/Antwerp_Forum_report_AMS_eng.pdf 
23 Huynh, Tu T. Yung Jong Park, Anna Ying Chen, “Faces of China: new Chinese migrants in South Africa, 1980s to 
Present”. African and Asian Studies, Vol.9, No. 3: 286-306, 2010; 
http://www.academia.edu/1765362/Faces_of_China_New_Chinese_Migrants_in_South_Africa_1980s_to_Present. 
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The second category includes traders, businesspeople and investors, mostly from an urban 
background. Just like in Eastern Europe and at about the same time, they were the first to explore this 
virgin territory for business opportunities, pioneering individual agents of China rapid economic 
expansion. This group has now diversified to include not only individual businesspeople and 
independent professionals (medical practitioners for instance), but also employees or owners of 
Chinese companies with often very considerable interests in Africa that include mining, construction, 
manufacture, land development and agriculture. Development projects are another important aspect to 
China’s presence in Africa. According to Deborah Brautigam, Chinese companies carry out most of 
the African Development Bank and World Bank projects in Africa.24
The third category is mostly rural migrants from the overseas Chinese areas in Southern Zhejiang 
and Central Fujian. They arrived somewhat later in Africa, sometimes in the first instance as 
extensions of Europe’s large communities from these areas. For these migrants, migration to Africa is 
not part of a state or corporate effort to strengthen China’s presence on the continent. Not infrequently, 
these overseas Chinese migrants (especially the Zhejiangese who were longest established in Europe) 
followed existing post-colonial links into Africa from the European country where they or their family 
had settled. From Portugal Chinese travelled to the Cape Verde Islands, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, or 
Mozambique; from France, they left for Francophone African countries. 
  
 Conversely, many migrants come to Africa in the hope to move on to other, more promising 
destinations in the developed world. There is also much mobility between African countries as Chinese 
migrants seek out opportunities for employment or business. South Africa, for instance, increasingly 
serves as a springboard for Chinese into other countries in Southern Africa. They set up or seek 
employment in trading companies or shops that specialize in the cheap manufactured goods that China 
produces in copious quantities and for which there is a ready market in many parts of Africa.25
The fourth and final category of Chinese in Africa is skilled and unskilled workers recruited by 
companies or agencies in China to work on construction projects carried out by Chinese companies in 
Africa.
  
26 The less-skilled tend to return after the end of their contract, at least some of the managers 
and professionals remain in the African host country as independent migrants, often establishing 
themselves as small entrepreneurs.27 The official total figure for contract and labour cooperation 
migrants has increased from 39,000 in 1997 to 114,000 in 2007.28
While the rapid increase and diversification of Chinese migration to African countries is commonly 
known, statistics widely vary. A reasonable total estimated figure, including older and newer migrants, 
would be around 500,000 Chinese residents in the entire African continent, up from around 100,000 in 
  
                                                     
24 Deborah Brautigam, “China in Africa: seven myths”. Real Instituto Elcano. 2 August 2011; 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zo
nas_in/sub-saharan+africa/ari23-2011#_ftn22. 
25 Heidi Østbø Haugen and Jørgen Carlin, “On the edge of the Chinese diaspora: The surge of baihuo business in an African 
city”, Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 639-662, 2005; Gregor Dobler, “Chinese shops and the formation of 
an expatriate community in Namibia”, The China Quarterly 199, pp. 707-727, 2009. 
26 Already by 2005, there were 1,609 government-licensed private employment agencies; Malia Politzer, “China and Africa: 
Stronger Economic Ties Mean More Migration”, 2008; 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=690. 
27 Yoon Jung Park, Chinese Migration in Africa. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2009, p. 6;  
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/29711/1/SAIIA%20Occasional%20Paper%20no%2024.pdf?1 
28 Li Pengtao, “Zhong-Fei guanxi de fazhan yu Feizhou Zhongguo xin yimin” (The development of Chinese-African 
relations and new Chinese migrants in Africa). Huaqiao Huaren lishi yanjiu, Year 2010, No. 4, p. 25. On the website of 
the China-Africa Joint Association for Industry and Trade (Zhongguo Feizhou Lianhe Gongshanghui) is a list of the 
number of Chinese contract labourers in a wide variety of African countries in 2008; http://www.china-
africajcci.org/news.asp?id=295 
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2000. By far the greatest concentration of Chinese migrants is in South Africa (200,000-300,000), with 
Nigeria as a second-largest host country (50,000).29
3. China’s governance of international migration 
  
For a correct understanding of China’s governance of international migration the basic observation 
should first be made that China knows no uniform, comprehensive and consistent approach. Instead, 
there are many, each associated with certain parts of the administration (usually a ministry, sometimes 
a CCP department). To add to the confusion, local governments often pursue their own agenda, which 
may (or may not) be at odds with priorities entertained by the Centre. The only consolation is the fact 
that this true for all policy areas in China. Fragmentation is intrinsic to China’s system of government, 
in which there is no distinction between politics and administration. As a result, all administration is 
politicized; conversely, all politics is administratively informed.30
Emigration, migrants and return migration are aspects of many policy fields. Most important 
among these are overseas Chinese affairs, strengthening China role in the world, development 
assistance to foreign countries, economic development in China itself, attracting high-end foreign and 
returnee talent, avoiding the “middle income trap”, national security and maintenance of the leading 
role of the CCP, and no doubt several more. We will not be able to do justice to all of these, but will 
focus on just a few that seem most germane to the purposes of this report. 
 
3.1 Overseas Chinese affairs 
Since the end of the 19th century, policies of China’s governments toward emigrated Chinese and their 
descendants have wavered between two opposing notions, one inclusive, the other restrictive. The 
inclusive notion recognizes all Chinese worldwide, regardless of nationality or residence (and 
sometimes even ethnicity), as belonging to the Chinese nation. The opposite is a restricted notion of 
“Chinese” that only includes those who live in China, often further restricted in terms of either having 
Chinese ethnicity of descent or else citizenship.  
After 1955, when at the Bandung Conference China committed itself to a leadership role in the 
movement of non-aligned countries, the People’s Republic of China adopted a severely restricted 
notion of Chineseness in its dealings with emigrants, returned migrants and their descendants. This 
was a concession to Indonesia and other Southeast Asia countries in particular that were very weary of 
China’s potential involvement in their very large and influential Chinese communities. 
A cornerstone of the policies that followed from this choice was the refusal to allow dual 
citizenship. This was a sharp break with the past. Both the Qing dynasty in the last decades of its rule 
and the Republic of China after the fall of the Qing in 1912 were committed to a policy of automatic 
Chinese citizenship for all ethnic Chinese. Now suddenly, overseas Chinese were encouraged to adopt 
the nationality of their country of residence and to give up their Chinese nationality. Overseas Chinese 
affairs (qiaowu) thus was limited to Chinese abroad who had retained Chinese citizenship (termed 
“overseas Chinese”, Huaqiao), dependents left behind in China (called qiaojuan), and overseas 
Chinese who had returned to China (guiqiao). All other “ethnic Chinese” (Huaren) were considered 
foreign nationals beyond China’s responsibility. The main objective of this policy was to limit the 
                                                     
29 These figures are from Li 2010, pp. 24-31. They tally well with the figure on South Africa of between 200,000 and 
350,000 from the Hyunh, Park and Chen (2010) cited earlier in this section. Emmanual Ma Mung, “Chinese and China’s 
foreign policy in Africa”, Journal of Chinese Overseas, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 91-109, 2008, provides an estimate for the 
whole of Africa of 270,000-520,000. 
30 The first to formulate this “fragmented authoritarianism” approach to Chinese politics were Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel 
Oksenburg in their book Policy making in China: leaders, structures, and processes, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1988. 
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diplomatic fallout on the PRC’s relations with countries where ethnic Chinese resided, particularly in 
Southeast Asia. A secondary objective was to ensure the flow of remittances that supported overseas 
Chinese dependants in China, while insulating socialist China from unchecked bourgeois influences 
emanating from the overseas Chinese.31
In 1977, after the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution period, China formally reinstated these 
notionally restrictive policies, but immediately their scope was widened in practice to include 
significant elements of the other, inclusive notion of Chineseness. Compared to the pre-Cultural 
Revolution period, the privileges and profile of overseas Chinese and returned overseas Chinese were 
expanded in an effort to strengthen their attachment and dedication to the land of their ancestors. 
Overseas Chinese were encouraged to make charitable donations to their native place. They also were 
encouraged to return to China for visits to their place of origin, and for tourism, study, or business.  
 
With reform and opening up, overseas Chinese had become much more than a liability that had to 
be managed. Their access to foreign capital, know-how and markets made them a valuable asset that 
had to be carefully cultivated. It no longer was particularly relevant whether a particular overseas 
Chinese investor, businessman, or academic held Chinese or a foreign nationality: all were now kith 
and kin to be welcomed back in the embrace of the Chinese fatherland. This approach yielded rich 
dividends: since the start of reform overseas Chinese have generated the vast bulk of inward overseas 
investment in China. Furthermore, by formally hanging on to a restrictive approach to overseas 
Chinese, China can choose to involve itself in the internal affairs of overseas Chinese communities 
and their countries of residence only to the extent that this conforms to China’s own interests. There is 
no obligation, unless China wants to do so, to represent overseas Chinese interests outside China’s 
own borders, with the exception of the interests of Chinese passport holders. Because of the ban on 
dual citizenship that China continues to hang on to, the latter are almost all recent migrants. They are 
therefore relatively powerless both in China itself and in their country of residence.32
As we have seen in the preceding sections, with the onset of reform an end also came to the PRC’s 
highly restrictive emigration policies. Already in the early 1970s, the almost complete ban on 
emigration was lifted, followed by progressively further relaxation after 1978. A milestone was the 
1985 “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the control of exit and entry of citizens”, in 2012 
incorporated into the “Exit and entry administration law of the People’s Republic of China”.
 
33 The 
regulations turned exit by Chinese citizens into a normal event in principle within reach of all Chinese 
citizens, although they explicitly stopped short from granting the automatic right to exit. Chapter 2 of 
the law requires Chinese citizens to apply for a passport and gain permission to travel abroad, giving 
almost unlimited scope to the authorities to refuse such permission if they wish to do so. Nevertheless, 
by the early 2000s, the government increasingly treated exit and entry, as Xiang Biao put it, “as an 
area of service rather than of control.”34 However, a key issue regarding exit of Chinese citizens for 
purposes of residence abroad remains that they lose their household registration in their place of 
residence in China.35
                                                     
31 Frank N. Pieke, “Four models of China's overseas Chinese policies”, China Information Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 8-16, 1987; 
Wang Gungwu, “Greater China and the Chinese overseas”, The China Quarterly 136, pp. 926-948, 1993; Wang Cangbai, 
Wong Siu-lun and Sun Wenbin, “Haigui: a new area in China’s policy toward the Chinese diaspora?”, Journal of the 
Chinese overseas Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 294–309, 2006.  
 With that, they and their children also forfeit a very extensive range of rights to 
32 Mette Thunø, “Reaching out and incorporating Chinese overseas: the trans-territorial scope of the PRC by the end of the 
20th century”, The China Quarterly 168, pp. 910-929, 2001; Elena Barabantseva, “Trans-nationalising Chineseness: 
overseas Chinese policies of the PRC's central government”, Asien 96, pp. 7-28, 2005.  
33 For the text of the 2012 “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo chujing rujing guanli fa” (Exit and entry administration law of the 
People’s Republic of China), see http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2012-07/01/content_1728516.htm. An unofficial 
translation is available at http://lawandborder.com/?p=1425.  
34 Xiang Biao, “Emigration from China: A Sending Country Perspective”, International Migration Vol. 41, No. 3, p. 22, 2003. 
35 Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho, “Caught between two worlds: mainland Chinese return migration, hukou considerations and the 
citizenship dilemma”, Citizenship Studies Vol. 15, Nos 6-7, pp. 643-658, 2011. 
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settlement, housing, education and welfare; their rights and legal status are therefore not much 
different from returning ethnic Chinese with foreign citizenship. If they were to choose to return to 
China, they will therefore have to do so as overseas Chinese rather than as ordinary Chinese citizens 
returning home and the local overseas Chinese affairs office is responsible for making arrangements, 
such as housing and schooling.36
Initially, the largest number of what in the 1990s became known as China’s “new migrants” came 
from China’s old overseas Chinese areas. These new migrants could therefore relatively easily be 
accommodated with the existing policy and institutional framework established for overseas Chinese 
affairs. Overseas Chinese affairs are fully integrated in the dense and complex mesh of Chinese 
administration. Usually at all levels of administration, from the Centre down to the county or even the 
township level, these include the government Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs (Qiaoban), the 
Overseas Chinese Federation (Qiaolian), the People’s Congress Overseas Chinese Commission 
(Huaqiao Weiyuanhui), and the People's Political Consultative Conference’s Taiwan, Hong Kong, 
Macao and Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (Zhengxie Tai-Ao-Gang Qiaowei). Furthermore, one 
of China’s eight so-called democratic parties that participate in the rule of China under the guidance of 
the CCP, the Zhigongdang (a name usually not translated but roughly meaning “party dedicated to the 
public cause”), represents returned overseas Chinese and the relatives of overseas Chinese.
 
37
3.2 Going out 
 Finally, the 
Chinese Communist Party’s United Front Department (Tongzhanbu) has overall responsibility for 
guidance, supervision and coordination of overseas Chinese affairs work across the administration. 
After the 1980s, the old overseas Chinese and their native places ceased to be a government priority. 
From the perspective of the central government, new overseas Chinese migration, both from the 
traditional overseas Chinese areas and from other parts of China, often was more of an issue to be 
managed than an asset to be developed. The connection with illegality, asylum seeking and human 
smuggling made unskilled and unregulated overseas Chinese emigration a diplomatic headache for the 
central government in its dealings with receiving countries, especially those in the developed world. 
These insisted, reasonably or unreasonably, on a Chinese crackdown on “snakeheads” and a cooperative 
attitude in the admission of repatriated illegal immigrants and refugees who had been refused asylum.  
An altogether different matter is the migration of students, skilled professionals, businesspeople 
and, increasingly, organized contract workers. In Chinese discussions, as far as Chinese enterprises, 
investments and contract labour are concerned, these new foreign connections and migratory flows are 
usually connected to the government’s so-called “going out” (zou chuqu) drive to strengthen China’s 
economic presence abroad.  
“Going out” was initiated in the latter half of the 1990s in the run-up to China’s WTO accession in 
2002. At the time, the Asian financial crisis of 1997 had left China largely unaffected, putting the 
country in a relatively favourable position to take advantage of business opportunities abroad. The 
surge in student and professional migration, however, predates the “going out” drive by at least five 
years when in the early 1990s the Chinese government allowed self-funded study abroad (as distinct 
from students on a government scholarship). As we shall see, in this area, not “going out”, but 
“inviting in” (yin jinlai) is the key consideration. 
                                                     
36 Article 13 of the 2012 Exit and Entry Law. Against this background, it seems highly significant that recently Ma Jianguo, 
vice chairman of Jiangsu Provincial Committee of China Zhi Gong Party, at the annual session of the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference National Committee, announced that China shall issue special identity documents for 
overseas Chinese to provide them the same convenience concerning children education, medical service, home purchases 
and entrance-exit procedures as domestic citizens to facilitate overseas Chinese returning to the motherland to live and 
start businesses; “Reforms urged to attract overseas Chinese”, Xinhua News Agency, 11 March 2012, 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/NPC_CPPCC_2012/2012-03/11/content_24865428.htm 
37 Elena Barabantseva, “Trans-nationalising Chineseness: overseas Chinese policies of the PRC's central government”, Asien 
96, pp. 7-28, 2005. 
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The “going out” policy is associated most to the Ministry of Commerce, whose profile in China’s 
international involvement has risen steadily in the 1990s and 2000s. As the main ministry (zhuguan 
bu) dealing with foreign economic cooperation, the Ministry of Commerce is at the centre of labour 
export policy, which is ultimately about its contribution to the Chinese economy. This role was 
expanded after the restructuring and readjustment of the tasks of ministries in 2009. The Ministry of 
Commerce already had responsibility over those who were sent abroad through contracting, but since 
then also has been made responsible for managing Chinese individuals working abroad.38
Regarding foreign study, however, the Ministry of Education takes the lead; when we include the 
increasingly important issue of return migration of the highly educated, the Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security, the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of Public 
Security (in charge of border exit and entry) play an important role as well. However, here too the 
Ministry of Commerce is involved. Many returned “talents” settle in a science and innovation park 
that is managed through committees that fall under the Ministry of Commerce or the Department of 
Commercial Affairs of the local government.  
 
Policies for both organized labour export and new immigrants tend to come in packages that 
require cooperation between many different ministries. Adjustments to such a package will then 
inevitably lead to long-drawn out re-negotiations between the main ministry in charge (usually the 
Ministry of Commerce) and each of the other parts of government. If one ministry is slow in making 
the necessary budget adjustments or the like, the entire package is delayed. This process tends to be 
characterized by long delays resulting in slow change and inefficiency.39
Labour export on fixed-term contracts through recognized agencies was vigorously promoted in the 
2000s as an alternative for unregulated overseas Chinese migration, but there is no real evidence of 
success in the countries of the developed world. As we have seen in the section on Africa, labour 
export has become hugely important in the developing world, but not so much as an alternative to 
overseas Chinese migration, but rather simply as a completely separate flow associated with Chinese 
investments and projects.  
 
Especially after 2003, labour export (often somewhat euphemistically called “foreign labour 
cooperation”, duiwai laowu hezuo) increased rapidly. According to the Ministry of Commerce, in 2010 
346,888 workers were dispatched abroad. The top-five source provinces of these workers were 
Shandong, Jiangsu, Henan, Guangdong and Hubei. According to data from the State Statistical Bureau, 
in 2009 154,801 contracts were signed with a value of US$6.73 billion. Of the contract workers sent 
abroad since 1978, a full 40% worked in construction, 28% in manufacture, 11% in agriculture, forestry, 
animal husbandry and fishery, 7% in transport and transportation, 5% in catering, and 9% in other 
sectors of the economy. More than 80% of all contract labour export takes place within Asia.  
Despite its growing importance, foreign contract employment remains insufficiently regulated. 
Many unlicensed intermediaries fleece gullible and inexperienced Chinese workers. More in general, 
Chinese workers abroad lack any form of Chinese legal protection. In response, in 2012 the Ministry 
of Commerce promulgated the “Regulations for the administration of foreign labour cooperation”.40
                                                     
38 Interview with Feng Lei, Institute of Finance and Trade Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 10 September 
2012. The Ministry of Commerce for instance hosts the website for the “going out” drive; http://zcq.mofcom.gov.cn/. 
 
These regulations for the first time provide a clear framework for employment and intermediaries. 
Earlier State Council regulations from 2008 were principally aimed at Chinese enterprises engaging in 
contract labour, while in the new regulations the positive rights of the workers are also mentioned. In 
article 44, for instance, the new regulations stipulate that the fees of employing companies should 
conform to China’s domestic labour contract law of 2008.  
39 Interview with Feng Lei, 10 September 2012. 
40 For the full text of the 2012 “Duiwai laowu hezuo guanli tiaoli” (Regulations for the administration of foreign labour 
cooperation), see http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-06/11/content_2157905.htm. The 2008 State Council “Duiwai chengbao 
gongcheng tiaoli” (Regulations for projects on foreign contracts) can be found at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2008-
07/28/content_1058146.htm. 
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The regulations also stipulate measures against other problems with labour export. Currently, 
contracts usually start with a government agreement. Then the local Chinese consulate and Chinese 
enterprises obtain specific information about labour supply and demand, making use of the services of 
usually state-owned intermediaries that have the right to send contract workers abroad. There is thus 
insufficient scope for Chinese labour supply and foreign demand to meet freely and workers often lack 
training and qualifications for work abroad. There are also no guarantees that workers abroad do not 
anything that is, as the regulations put it, “bad for the country” (Article 15). To address these issues 
the Ministry of Commerce plans to provide a free information service to both enterprises and workers, 
establish an international labour cooperation information and notification system (article 30), and set 
up a foreign labour cooperation risk assessment and evaluation system (article 31).The state will 
financially support training programs, and in cooperation with the Ministry of Personnel and Social 
Security the Ministry of Commerce will increase supervision of the training programs. Where 
relevant, local governments at the county level and above should establish an international labour 
service desk to provide service, as well as encourage and guide worker recruitment (article 34). The 
2012 regulations promise work on a crisis management system at the state and local (county and 
above) level (article 36) and a publicly accessible black list of domestic and international 
untrustworthy businesses (article 37). Finally, under the heading “legal responsibility”, article 40 
states that permission to engage in labour cooperation will be cancelled in the case of 1) the 
organization of labour under a business, travel, or study visa; 2) loaning out one’s license to other 
organizations or individuals; 3) organizing labour related to gambling or prostitution.41
Risk assessment and evaluation are a particularly acute issue, not only for workers but also for 
Chinese enterprises abroad. Earlier in 2012, the Ministry of Commerce had issued a document 
proposing a warning and information system for incidents endangering Chinese workers’ lives and 
possessions.
 
42
3.3 Foreign study and “inviting in” 
 The proposal describes different kinds of risks and ways workers abroad should be 
notified of these risks. The proposal came right after the kidnapping of 29 Chinese workers in Sudan 
and 24 workers in Egypt (two of 13 such incidents in the last five years), and the subsequent 
discussion about the fate of Chinese workers abroad in international and domestic media.  
Studying abroad has become the fastest growing flow of foreign migration; (former) students account 
for most of the growth of the Chinese population in many destination countries, especially in the 
developed world. Study abroad has long ceased to be the privilege only of China’s most talented 
youth. Many senior high school graduates will at some point have the opportunity to study abroad for 
a period of time43
                                                     
41 Zhang Ning, “Renli ziyuan ‘zou chuqu’ fangshi chuangxin” (Innovation of methods for human resources ‘to go out’), in 
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getting kidnapped abroad”, Christian Science Monitor. 1 February 2012; http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-
Pacific/2012/0201/Why-Chinese-workers-are-getting-kidnapped-abroad; Zhu Dazhi, “The country’s influence is large, 
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prepared for an application to a foreign elite university in pre-university programmes, private high 
schools, or, in some cases, even earlier than that.  
Self-funded study abroad was permitted in the early 1990s; by 2010, 93% of Chinese students 
abroad were self-financed.44
However, as the Chinese economy has grown Chinese students and professionals abroad are 
increasingly talked about in terms of a brain drain. According to the Ministry of Education, at the end 
of 2011 the accumulated number of Chinese students abroad was 2,244,100, of whom 818,400 or 36% 
have returned to China. This is considered very low by policy makers and advisors in China, 
especially in view of the fact that the higher the educational qualifications attained, the lower the 
chance that a student returns.
 Only a minority of these students ever return to China, but find 
employment, obtain permanent residency and ultimately citizenship abroad. Until the early 2000s, this 
was a matter that raised remarkably few questions in China itself. In fact, the opportunity to study 
abroad has for many aspiring Chinese individuals and families been one of the great gifts of the reform 
era; restricting this freedom would very likely come at a disproportionately high political price. 
45
Policy has increasingly emphasized return, as part of the “inviting in” of foreign businesses and 
individuals (yin jinlai). In 1987 returning was made a legal requirement for publicly funded students. 
In 1993 a policy was adopted towards students abroad summarized as “support study overseas, 
promote return home, maintain freedom of movement” (zhichi liuxue, guli huiguo, laiqu ziyou).
 
46 In 
1996 China started actively encouraging students abroad to return with the founding of the China 
Scholarship Council. Policy documents have been coming out every year, for example 2007 
regulations according to which publicly funded students have to return upon completion of their 
degree and work in China for a minimum of 2 years. Failure to do so results in having to pay back the 
entire scholarship plus a 30% service charge.47
Despite the relatively low return percentage, returnees are very prominent among academics and 
senior administrators in higher education and research institutions, especially the more prestigious and 
better funded ones. Others are high-tech entrepreneurs or independent professionals; yet others work 
for large multinationals or government. National and local governments and university administrations 
strongly encourage students and scholars abroad to return to China to take up academic employment, 
encouraging them with a range of privileges and perks (salary, housing, research funds) regardless of 
foreign permanent residence status or even citizenship. 
 
Returnees, or haigui in Chinese, have become a policy priority in China. Chinese administrations 
actively recruit among overseas graduates and scholars and encourage them to set up businesses or 
contribute their knowledge, skills and patents to partnerships with Chinese businesses. To woo 
potential investors, governments frequently organize conventions or fairs, creating what Xiang Biao 
has called an elaborate “ritual economy of ‘talent’.”48
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Educated Chinese abroad are increasingly talked about in terms of brain gain, a huge talent pool 
that China will be able to draw on in the years to come. At the Centre, return migration is directly 
linked with a key strategic issue that preoccupied the new Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao regime that came to 
power in 2002. In order to strengthen China and its position in the world, China will have to retain its 
long-term competitiveness and not get caught into the so-called “middle-income trap.” The way to do 
this is for China to make the transition to technology-intensive economic growth. Attracting or 
keeping highly educated workers and entrepreneurs, or “talents” (rencai) in Chinese government 
jargon, became central to this.49 In 2010, the government published a long-term talents strategy that in 
2011 was incorporated into the 12th Five-Year Plan.50
It should be emphasized that recruiting educated Chinese abroad is only one aspect of this policy, 
and a conscious effort is made also to attract “real” (this is the way it is often put in more informal 
discussions) foreigners to live and work long-term in China. Nevertheless, the vast majority of people 
thus lured back to China continue to have a Chinese background; conversely, ethnic Chinese are much 
easier given long-term or permanent residency. For instance, the government’s flagship Thousand 
Talents Programme by August 2011 already recruited over 1,500 leading scientists and entrepreneurs. 
Over 70% were foreign nationals, mostly ethnic Chinese.
 
51
4. Conclusion 
  
In both Africa and Europe, and indeed all over the world, Chinese immigration has shot up in the last 
decades. From a Chinese perspective, Africa and Europe are very different places. Europe is a 
continent where Chinese have resided for many decades. In Europe, universities and other educational 
institutions hold the promise of valuable knowledge and qualifications that qualitatively raise career 
prospects and life chances. Europe is among the most highly developed economies in the world, with 
not only a huge market for Chinese products and services, but also a place for strategic investments in 
high-value assets and market access and source of state-of-the art technology and skills. More 
abstractly, Europe is a focus of Chinese modernist longings, a place that long ago achieved a state of 
modernity that China still yearns for. Africa is the exact opposite of all of these things, but therefore 
arguably strategically even more important for China as a country and – even more significantly – for 
individual Chinese migrants and firms. As a continent on which, to Chinese migrants at least, the road 
to modernity still seems to be much less fixed, Africa complements China; China and Chinese 
migrants can conceivably play a central role in the future of the continent. In Western Europe, Chinese 
migrants, capital and government can at best only aspire to a role in the margins. Only in parts of 
Eastern and Central Europe could Chinese investments and people play a role somewhat similar to 
Africa, albeit on a much smaller scale. 
However, viewed from another angle, Europe isn’t all that different from Africa. Granted, in terms 
of educational migration, Europe is one of the world’s most important destinations. Conversely, Africa 
is the location of many Chinese investment projects and with that the destination of large numbers of 
contract workers employed for a fixed term on a specific project. However, in terms of the drivers of 
migration and the background and origin of many other migrants, many similarities and indeed direct 
connections exist. Just like Africa, much of Eastern and Southern Europe has been a frontier of 
Chinese outward migration, with many migrants ending up in surprisingly similar employment or 
businesses, often associated with the import, wholesale and retail of Chinese manufactures. Since the 
1980s, China has also generated commercialized and highly professional migration configurations 
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from Zhejiang, Fujian, and many urban areas that have developed a global reach, always seeking out 
new destinations and ways and means to get migrants there. To these migrants, there often actually 
isn’t that much difference between Africa, Europe, Latin America, or any other destination. What is 
most important is the opportunity to emigrate and then to make the best of whatever chances there are 
to make a living or perhaps to move on to another, more promising destination. 
Migration from China has become extremely diverse. The Chinese authorities have reacted 
pragmatically, without making any real attempt to construct a coherent and transparent framework of 
policies and institutions to deal with emigration, Chinese populations abroad and return migration. 
Conflicts and confusions between different policy fields and agendas cannot be resolved within the 
framework of overseas Chinese affairs. Rhetorically, the term “overseas Chinese” continues to be 
useful to way for Chinese government and emigrants to perform at specific occasions or for certain 
specific purposes the transnational unity of the Chinese nation, regardless of nationality, ethnicity, 
residence, or class. However, overseas Chinese affairs has remarkably few material implications, 
except when dealing with return visits or return migration of ethnic Chinese where “overseas Chinese 
affairs” provides a convenient framework both to fit and to insulate such returnees from Chinese 
society. The language and institutions of overseas Chinese affairs are ill-suited to cater fully to the 
priorities and expectations of migrants that do not come from any of the designated overseas Chinese 
areas, in particular high-skilled migrants, such as students, businesspeople, professionals, expatriates, 
or investors. In practice, therefore, they are treated largely separately, not only from each other, but 
also from other new labour migrants, either from old overseas Chinese areas or elsewhere.  
In sum, there does not seem to be a coherent and joined-up strategy on the part of the Chinese 
government to maximize the utility of Chinese emigration to China’s long-term goals of continued 
modernization and a more prominent place in the world. As we have seen in this paper, certain aspects 
of migration or certain types of migrants are enlisted to serve specific policy objectives, such as 
technological upgrading of China’s economy, a more prominent role of Chinese enterprises abroad, or 
relief of unemployment pressures in certain sectors or areas. Other, troublesome aspects of migration 
have been the target of policy making aimed at minimizing the damage that they do. However, to read 
into these efforts the orchestration or manipulation of international migration to serve the Chinese 
government’s global strategic objectives would be vastly overstating the point. 
 
